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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
Katherine Ennis Wychulis
David S. Haddock, II**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews recent developments in the law affecting
Virginia businesses and corporations. Part II discusses recent
judicial decisions in Virginia courts involving businesses and
corporations. Part III discusses several acts of the 1995 session
of the Virginia General Assembly that amend Virginia's corpo-
rate, partnership, limited liability company and securities act
statutes.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Virginia Anti-Takeover Statutes: WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson
Foods, Inc.
A hostile takeover attempt of a Virginia corporation spawned
four decisions in 1994 by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia (hereinafter Tyson I,'
Tyson 11,2 Tyson III,' and Tyson IV4). In these cases, the dis-
* Associate, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., McLean, Virginia; BA, 1987, The College
of William and Mary; J.D., 1992, University of Virginia.
** Associate, Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., McLean, Virginia; BA, 1991, Princeton
University; J.D., 1994, University of Virginia. The authors wish to extend special
thanks to Thomas E. Repke and Timothy J. Carlson, associates in the McLean office
of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P., for their help in researching and writing this article.
1. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 492 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(Tyson 1).
2. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(Tyson 11).
3. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. Va. 1994)
(Tyson III).
4. WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Va. 1994)
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trict court resolved several issues regarding fiduciary duties of
directors for a target corporation defending against a hostile
takeover attempt (Tyson I, Tyson IV), addressed certain issues
arising under the Virginia Control Share Acquisitions Act
(Tyson II) and affirmed the constitutionality of Virginia's anti-
takeover statutes (Tyson III). Tyson Foods, Inc. ("Tyson"), a for-
eign corporation, had attempted a hostile takeover of WLR
Foods, Inc. ("WLR"), a Virginia corporation, with a thirty dol-
lars per share tender offer to WLR shareholders.5 WLR re-
sponded with a series of defensive measures, as follows, and
then filed suit for a declaratory judgment affirming their validi-
ty:
6
(1) adoption of a discriminatory shareholder rights plan
('Poison Pill') and refusal to redeem it in the face of
Tyson's tender offer;
(2) adoption of lucrative severance agreements for senior
officers to take effect in the event of a change in control of
WLR ('Golden Parachutes');
(3) adoption of similar, less lucrative severance agree-
ments for most WLR employees ('Other Parachutes');
(4) amendment of the bylaws setting the record date for
any special meeting held pursuant to the Control Share [Ac-
quisitions] Acte as the date on which the acquiring person
requests such a meeting ('Record Date Amendment');
(5) amendment of the bylaws to clarify that the Chair-
man and Vice Chairman of the Board are officers of the
Board of Directors, rather than officers of WLR ('Officers
Amendment'); and
(6) resignation as employees of four directors for the
purpose of their voting in the control share referendum
('Resignations').8
The district court first heard and ruled on Tyson's objection to
discovery orders (Tyson I) and on two motions (Tyson II and
Tyson III) for a preliminary injunction, all of which were decid-
(Tyson IV).
5. Tyson ultimately withdrew its tender offer because of the "uncertainty and
delay caused by [the] litigation." Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 421.
6. Tyson III, 861 F. Supp. at 1279.
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
8. Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 421.
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ed in WLR's favor. Finally, the district court issued the declar-
atory judgment, ruling in WLR's favor on all questions
(Tyson IV).
1. Fiduciary Duties of Directors
a. Standard of Conduct for Directors of Target Corporation in
Hostile Takeover Attempt
In Tyson I, Tyson objected to nondispositive discovery orders
of a magistrate judge which prevented Tyson from inquiring
into the substance of professional advice given to WLR in con-
nection with Tyson's attempted takeover of WLR.9 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia over-
ruled the objection, holding that Virginia's standard of director
conduct is process-oriented rather than substantive. Accordingly,
the advice which a target corporation receives in a hostile take-
over attempt is irrelevant in determining whether directors
acted in good faith.'0 The only issue for the court concerns
whether the directors followed the appropriate decisionmaking
process.
Virginia law requires directors of a Virginia corporation to
"discharge [their] duties as ... director[s] ... in accordance
with [their] good faith business judgment of the best interests
of the corporation" (Business Judgment Statute)." Basing its
decision on two of the Virginia anti-takeover statutes specifical-
ly invoking the Business Judgment Statute, the district court
determined that the Business Judgment Statute is the only
standard provided by the legislature to measure director con-
duct in the case presented.'
The district court first addressed how to evaluate the
directors' "good faith" when defending against a hostile takeover
9. Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 493.
10. Id. at 493-95.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
12. Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 495 (citing provisions of VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-646
and -728.9). Section 13.1-728.9 of the Virginia Code provides, in part, that "with re-
spect to any potential changes in control of any issuing public corporation [the Busi-
ness Judgment Statute applies]." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.9 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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attempt. The district court observed that the standards for
director conduct found in the Business Judgment Statute and
the Model Business Corporation Act (Model Act) are generally
similar, except that the reasonableness standard imposed by the
Model Act is absent from the Business Judgment Statute. 3
The district court interpreted this difference as a "legislative
rejection of a substantive evaluation of director conduct."" In
determining the legislative intent of how to measure a director's
good faith, the district court found its answer in the language
of the Business Judgment Statute itself. The district court rea-
soned that because the Business Judgment Statute provides a
"safe harbor" for directors who rely on competent advice, the
legislature intended for "good faith" to be measured by the
directors' "resort to an informed decisionmaking process." 5 In
so holding, the district court departed from a line of Delaware
case law requiring an evaluation of the reasonableness of the
directors' conduct. 6
However, the court found that directors' "resort to the pro-
cess" must be undertaken in good faith, that is, "the directors
must believe in good faith that their advisors are competent to
render the advice sought, and they must be aware of no facts
which would make reliance on that advice unwarranted." 7 The
court clarified that a director's obligation to use good faith in
resorting to the process could not be measured by the substan-
tive soundness of the director's actions, because this would
undermine the legislature's rejection of the Model Act's rea-
sonableness standard." The court then set forth the appropri-
ate scope of discovery into the "procedural indicia" of whether a
director acted in good faith under the Business Judgment
Statute.'9 Specifically, such procedural indicia include:
13. Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 494. Compare MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)
(1994) with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Repl. Vol. 1993). See Daniel T. Murphy, The
New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 67, 104-09 (1985).
14. Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 494.
15. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993)). This provision of
the Business Judgment Statute entitles directors to rely on information that they
believe in good faith to be competent. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B).
16. Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 495 (1994).
17. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
the identity and qualifications of any sources of information
or advice sought which bear on the decision reached, the
circumstances surrounding selection of these sources, the
general topics (but not the substance) of the information
sought or imparted, whether advice was actually given,
whether it was followed, and if not, what sources of infor-
mation and advice were consulted to reach the decision in
issue.'
Applying the above reasoning, the district court concluded
that the substance of the advice received by the directors was
irrelevant to the determination of "good faith" under Virginia's
Business Judgment Statute. Because the substance of the ad-
vice would therefore not be "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence," the District Court affirmed
the Magistrate Judge's ruling over Tyson's objection.2
b. Application of the Tyson Standard of Director Conduct
The district court applied its previously announced standard
of conduct for directors of a target corporation in defending
against a hostile takeover attempt when it addressed whether
to grant WLR its request for a declaratory judgmentY The
district court granted the declaratory judgment, concluding that
the WLR "directors' decisionmaking process provided a clear
indication that their decisions were undertaken pursuant to
their good faith business judgment of the best interests of the
corporation."' Furthermore, regardless of the high level of pro-
tection afforded by the Business Judgment Statute and of the
effect of the anti-takeover statutes to impede hostile tender
offers, the legislature, not the courts, is responsible for chang-
ing these results.'
In reaching its conclusion that the WLR directors acted in
good faith, the district court set forth the steps taken by the
directors which proved to the district court that the directors
20. Id-
21. Id. at 495-96.
22. Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 419.
23. Id. at 423.
24. Id. at 424.
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"sought out and relied in good faith upon competent legal and
financial advisors."' The court observed that before adopting
such defensive measures, the board of directors received legal
and financial advice from independent advisors 6 at two meet-
ings that each lasted over four hours." At the first meeting
(January 28 Meeting), the advisors provided detailed materials
to the board to help it prepare for the second meeting
(February 4 Meeting), at which the directors adopted the Poison
Pill, the Golden Parachutes, the Other Parachutes, the Record
Date Amendment, the Officers Amendment, and post-retirement
health insurance coverage for the four employee directors who
resigned as employees pursuant to the Resignations (collectively
referred to as Defensive Measures).28
At the January 28 Meeting (at which the directors took no
action), the advisors offered information on the "legal and finan-
cial implications" of the Tyson tender offer and on "whether to
adopt a Poison Pill and what its terms should be, and whether
to adopt Golden Parachutes." 9 At the February 4 Meeting, the
directors received a "comprehensive review of the financial
details of Tyson's offer and [the advisors] concluded that the
offer was inadequate."" The court provided a laundry list of
certain of the items addressed in the advisors' presentation at
the February 4 Meeting:
WLR's recent past financial performance; important consid-
erations taken into account in valuing WLR; the perfor-
mance, ownership, and trading activity of WLR's common
stock; a summary of comments by research analysts regard-
ing WLR; a comparison of WLR to other, similarly situated
publicly traded companies; analysis of other recent acquisi-
tions by Tyson; a detailed valuation of WLR and financial
25. Id. at 422.
26. The legal advisors were Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver and Sullivan & Crom-
well, and the financial advisors were Goldman, Sachs, & Co. and Wheat First Butch-
er & Singer. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 422-23; Tyson II, 857 F. Supp. at 497. With respect to the Resignations
of the employee directors in their capacities as employees, the Business Judgment
Statute is not implicated for the reason that the resigning individuals were not "dis-
charging their duties as directors." Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 423.
29. Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 422.
30. Id.
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analysis at different offer prices; a summary of factors war-
ranting Tyson's interest in acquiring WLR; analysis of
several different merger scenarios incorporating numerous
financial variables; and an examination of several alterna-
tives to Tyson's offer."'
At both meetings, the directors asked questions of the advi-
sors, and at the February 4 Meeting, the directors engaged in
independent discussion." The directors at the February 4
Meeting voted unanimously to reject Tyson's tender offer, and
they voted "in reliance upon advice given by the advisors" to
adopt the Defensive Measures.33 At a third meeting on
March 11, the advisors made "detailed, updated presentations"
on "most of the same general topics" as had been addressed at
the February 4 Meeting.' The directors "decided unanimously
that the offer was inadequate" and recommended to WLR
shareholders that they not tender their shares to Tyson.
The district court found that based on the record, the direc-
tors did not merely "rubberstamp" the advisors' recommenda-
tions, nor did the directors have any information or knowledge
that would make their reliance on the advisors unwarranted. 6
The directors accordingly took their actions in "compliance with
their good faith business judgment of the best interests of the
corporation."37 The court was not persuaded by the apparent
leniency of this standard: "That the Business Judgment Stat-
ute ... may appear to offer more protection for directors than
do most or all analogous statutes in other states does not alter
its plain language."38
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Interestingly, the court observed that Tyson failed to present any evidence
that any action taken by the directors was not in the best interests of the corpora-
tion. Id. However, the court had already deemed such evidence irrelevant in Tyson L
See Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 494.
37. Tyson IV, 869 F. Supp. at 422-23.
38. Id. at 424.
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2. The Control Share Acquisitions Statute
One of Virginia's anti-takeover statutes is the Control Share
Acquisitions statute (Control Share Act),39 which imposes re-
strictions on the voting rights of a shareholder who acquires
shares within certain ranges of the corporation's total out-
standing voting stock. The Control Share Act provides that
shares acquired within the ranges of twenty percent to less
than thirty-three and one-third percent, thirty-three and one-
third percent to fifty percent and over fifty percent of the corpo-
ration's outstanding voting shares (Control Shares) have no
voting rights unless the disinterested shareholders vote to grant
such voting rights.4° Shares held by officers and by employees
who also serve as directors of the corporation are considered
"interested" and are not eligible to vote on whether to grant
voting rights to the Control Shares.4'
In anticipation of the shareholder vote on whether to grant
voting rights to Tyson's Control Shares (Referendum), the
WLR board amended the bylaws to set the record date as the
date that Tyson delivered its information statement pursuant to
the Control Share Act (Record Date Amendment)Y The WLR
board also amended the bylaws to clarify that the Chairman
and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors were officers of
the Board, but were not officers of the corporation, and accord-
ingly were eligible to vote in the Referendum.' In addition,
four employees who were also directors of WLR resigned as
employees in order to render themselves eligible to vote in the
Referendum." Tyson moved for a preliminary injunction chal-
lenging these three actions.
39. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
40. Id. §§ 13.1-728.1, -728.3(A-).
41. Id. § 13.1-728.3(B), -728.1.
42. Tyson II, 857 F. Supp. at 497. In order for the acquiring corporation to com-
mand a shareholder vote on whether to grant voting rights to the Control Shares, it
must deliver to the corporation (and to the shareholders along with notice of the
meeting) an information statement setting forth certain details about the status and
terms of the acquisition. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-728.4, -728.5(A), -728.6(B)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 1993).
43. Tyson 11, 857 F. Supp. at 497.
44. Id.
[Vol. 29:825832
BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
The factors for determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction are:
(1) the likelihood of irreparable harm to Tyson without the
injunction; (2) the likelihood of irreparable harm to WLR
with the injunction; (3) Tyson's likelihood of success on the
merits; and (4) the public interest.5
The Referendum was held, and Tyson received 3,152,830
votes out of 10,896,672 shares eligible to vote, far short of the
majority needed to grant voting rights to its Control Shares.4"
In analyzing the validity of the actions taken in preparation for
the Referendum, the district court first examined the amount of
harm that Tyson would suffer if the injunction were not grant-
ed, and found that if none of the disputed shares were counted,
Tyson still would not have received a majority.47 The district
court decided that whether an injunction should issue depended
heavily on Tyson's likelihood of success on the merits." Tyson
alleged that WLR set the record date (April 14) for the Referen-
dum (Record Date) significantly in advance of the May 21 Con-
trol Share Referendum in order to decrease the number of
shares that would actually vote, and thereby decrease Tyson's
chances for winning a majority of the eligible shares.49 The
court concluded that because (1) Virginia law permits the by-
laws to fix a record date "in order to make a determination of
shareholders for any purpose,"" (2) the Record Date was not
set more than seventy days in advance of the Referendum in
accordance with Virginia statute,5' and (3) no dispute existed
as to whether the directors "undertook an informed
decisionmaking process with regard to the selection of a record
date" (the standard of director conduct previously announced by
45. Id. (citing Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189, 193-96
(4th Cir. 1977)).
46. Id. at 498.
47. Id. The court did describe one possible scenario in which Tyson could have
prevailed, but dismissed it as "unrealistic". Id. at 498 n.4.
48. Id. at 498.
49. Id. at 497, 499. Tyson reasoned that the further in advance the record date
was set, more shares would change hands, and shares eligible to vote that were not
held by current shareholders would be less likely to be voted. Id at 498.
50. Id. at 499 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-660(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
51. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-660(B))..
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the court in Tyson ),52 the Record Date Amendment was
valid.53
With respect to the resignations of the four employee direc-
tors (including the Chairman and Vice Chairman) in their ca-
pacities as employees (Resignations), Tyson argued that because
the four continued to perform the same functions after the
resignations as before, they were employees as well as directors
at the time of the Record Date. Therefore, their shares were
ineligible to be voted in the decision of whether to grant voting
rights to the Tyson Control Shares.' The district court did not
disagree that the four performed the same duties and functions
before and after the Resignations, but nevertheless found that
as of the Record Date, the four were not employees of the cor-
poration." The court found it irrelevant that the intent behind
the Resignations was to render the shares as being not "inter-
ested" and therefore eligible to vote in the Referendum." In
supporting its finding that none of the individuals was an em-
ployee of WCR after the Resignations, the court relied on the
following factors: (1) upon the Resignation, none received a sal-
ary; (2) they had neither the power to hire nor fire; (3) none
had either an office or a secretary; and (4) none had the au-
thority for giving orders or responsibility for taking orders.57
The district court concluded that because the four who resigned
in the Resignations were not "employees," their shares were not
interested and therefore were eligible to be voted in the Refer-
endum.58
3. Constitutionality of Virginia Anti-Takeover Statutes
Tyson moved for a preliminary injunction against WLR, alleg-
ing that the four statutes pursuant to which WLR acted to
defend against Tyson's hostile takeover attempt were invalid
52. Id. (citing Tyson I, 857 F. Supp. at 494).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 500.
55. Id. at 501.
56. Id. at 499.
57. Id. at 500.
58. Id. at 501.
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because they violated the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.59 The court found
that the likelihood of harm to Tyson and WLR, without and
with the injunction, respectively, turned on the likelihood of
Tyson's success on the merits.0 Accordingly, the court under-
took a constitutional analysis of the four statutes and concluded
that they did not violate the Constitution.
The four statutes alleged by Tyson to violate the Constitution
were: the Affiliated Transactions Act,61 the Control Share Ac-
quisitions Act,62 the Poison Pill Statute,63 and the Business
Judgment Statute." The Affiliated Transactions Act imposes
restrictions on certain transactions between a public Virginia
corporation and a ten-percent beneficial shareholder of the
corporation (Interested Shareholder). Under this Act, the corpo-
ration and an Interested Shareholder may not engage in certain
significant transactions, including mergers, without the approv-
al of both the majority of disinterested directors and the
holders of two-thirds of the corporation's voting shares (not
including the Interested Shareholder's shares).65 The Control
Share Act is summarized above in section ll.A.2. The Poison
Pill Statute authorizes a corporation to "create or issue rights,
options or warrants for the purchase of shares of the corpora-
tion upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration,
if any, and such purposes as may be approved by the board of
directors."6 Under the Poison Pill adopted by the WLR board,
once a shareholder acquired fifteen percent or more of WLR's
stock, all other shareholders would have the right to purchase
59. Tyson III, 861 F. Supp. at 1281 (citing the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST.
art. 'VI, cl. 2 and the Commerce ClausQ, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
60. Id.
61. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to -727.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
62. Id. §§ 13.1-728.1 to -728.9.
63. Id. § 13.1-646.
64. Id. § 13.1-690.
65. Id. § 13.1-725.1. After an Interested Shareholder has held the stock for three
years, the transaction may proceed upon (1) the approval of the disinterested direc-
tors or the holders of two-thirds of the voting shares (not including an interested
Shareholder's Shares) or (2) each holder of a class or series of voting shares receiving
consideration calculated as provided in the statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 725.1, 727(A)
(Repl. Vol. 1993).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-646(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
1995] 835
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$136 worth of WLR stock for sixty-eight dollars. 7 Once trig-
gered, the Poison Pill would reduce the percentage ownership
and the value of the shares held by the fifteen-percent
shareholder.68 The Business Judgment Statute sets forth the
standard of conduct of directors of Virginia corporations.69 (Col-
lectively, these four statutes are referred to as the Anti-Take-
over Statutes.)
In its motion for a preliminary injunction, Tyson raised two
constitutional challenges to the Anti-Takeover Statutes: first,
the statutes are preempted by the federal regulation of tender
offers,7 ° and second, the statutes violate the commerce clause.
The district court denied Tyson's motion, rejecting both consti-
tutional challenges to the statutes. 1
a. Preemption by Federal Regulation
The Williams Act "regulates disclosure to shareholders and
procedures required in tender offers."72 Tyson argued that a
purpose of the Williams Act is to create a balance between
management and the tender offeror,"3 and that because the
Anti-Takeover Statutes upset this balance by depriving a tender
offeror of a "meaningful opportunity for success,"74 they uncon-
stitutionally "stand as an obstacle to the purposes and objec-
tives of the Williams Act."75
67. Tyson III, 861 F. Supp. at 1280.
68. Id.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993). Directors are required to "dis-
charge [their] duties as ... director[s] . . . in accordance with [their] good faith busi-
ness judgment of the best interests of the corporation. Id.
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d,e), 14(d,f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d,e),
78n(d,f) (1988).
71. Tyson I1, 861 F. Supp. at 1289.
72. Id. at 1283. "The purpose of the Williams Act was to assure that shareholders
in connection with an acquisition through a tender offer would have the benefit of ap-
propriate information on which to base a decision as [to] whether to hold, sell, or
tender their shares." HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC COR-
PORATION, § 12.22 (1992).
73. Tyson II, 861 F. Supp. at 1283.
74. Id. at 1284 (citing other district court cases which applied the "meaningful
opportunity for success test" to determine whether the Williams Act preempts state
statutes).
75. Id. at 1283.
836 [Vol. 29:825
BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
The district court rejected the "meaningful opportunity for
success test" in favor of a test that would find preemption if
the Anti-Takeover Statutes favor either management or the
tender offeror over the investors.76 Applying this test, the court
found that none of the Anti-Takeover Statutes is preempted by
the Williams Act.77 Both the Control Share Acquisitions Act
and the Affiliated Transactions Act prevent abusive behavior by
an acquiror.7" The Control Share Acquisitions Act facilitates
informed choices by investors by requiring an acquiror to fur-
nish to the target corporation an information statement79 and
the Affiliated Transactions Act does not interfere with "the
ability of shareholders to make an informed choice about a
tender offer."80 Poison Pills may, to the benefit of shareholders,
increase the bid in tender offers, and they are not detrimental
to shareholders because the directors must act in their "good
faith business judgment of the best interests of the corpora-
tion."8 ' The court also found that the Business Judgment Stat-
ute, alone or together with the other Anti-Takeover Statutes,
does not "interfere with investors' free exercise of an informed
choice in responding to a tender offer."82
The court acknowledged that although the effect of the Anti-
Takeover Statutes is to "give power to management with the
same hand that it takes away from offerors, [the Anti-Takeover
Statutes] do not do so to the detriment of investors."' Accord-
ing to the court, the Anti-Takeover Statutes, separately or to-
gether, do not interfere with the Williams Act's objective to
"ensure that investors are permitted to make an informed
choice" and accordingly are not preempted.
76. Id. at 1277.
77. Id. at 1284, 1286.
78. Id. at 1285.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1286.
82. Id.
83. Id.
1995] 837
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b. Violation of the Commerce Clause
Tyson argued that the Anti-Takeover Statutes violate the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution for two
reasons: first, they "[eliminate] the flow of interstate commerce
in an article of commerce,"' and, second, they "impose a bur-
den on interstate commerce that clearly exceeds their putative
local benefits."85 The court rejected both arguments, holding
that the Anti-Takeover Statutes do not violate the Commerce
Clause.88
With respect to Tyson's first argument, the district court
decided that because the Anti-Takeover Statutes merely make
takeovers more expensive (by requiring an acquiror to make an
adequate offer), and because they affect in-state and out-of-state
offerors equally, the Anti-Takeover Statutes do not violate the
Commerce Clause.87 The court then turned to Tyson's second
argument, which required a balancing of the burdens and local
benefits.
The court acknowledged that the state "'has an interest in
promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the
corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in
such corporations have an effective voice in corporate af-
fairs.'"88 By contrast, the Anti-Takeover Statutes burden inter-
state commerce by making it "more difficult and more expensive
to gain control of a Virginia corporation" and by limiting the
number of successful tender offers; however, the ultimate effect
of the Anti-Takeover Statutes is to "ensure that tender offers
succeed only if they are consistent with the long-term interests
of the corporation."89 Furthermore, in-state and out-of-state
offerors have equal access to Virginia corporations. The district
84. Id. at 1288.
85. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
86. Id. at 1289.
87. Id. at 1288.
88. Id. at 1289 (quoting CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69,
91 (1987)).
89. Id.
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court therefore found that the Anti-Takeover Statutes do not
violate the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution."
The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction
for the reason that Tyson was not likely to succeed on the mer-
its of its arguments that the Virginia anti-takeover statutes
violate the Constitution under theories of preemption and viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause.91
B. Liability of Partners for Debts of a Partnership
In Citizens Bank of Massachusetts v. Parham-Woodman Medi-
cal Associates, 2 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia found that partners in a Virginia gener-
al partnership were not personally liable for debt attributable
to advances to the partnership under a loan agreement that
predated their joining the partnership.93
On April 30, 1985, the predecessor of Citizens Bank of Mas-
sachusetts (the Bank) and Parham-Woodman Medical Associ-
ates, a Virginia general partnership ("Partnership"), entered
into a construction loan agreement and term note, pursuant to
which the Bank agreed to loan the Partnership two million
dollars solely for the purpose of constructing a medical office
building.94 Nilda R. Ante ("Ante") and Larry E. King ("King")
were the sole general partners of the Partnership when the
loan documents were executed.95
In accordance with the terms of the loan agreement, the
Bank advanced funds from time to time during the construction
of the office building. As of June 3, 1986, the advances totaled
approximately $1.5 million.96 In June 1986, three additional
partners were admitted into the Partnership.9" From July 1986
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 874 F. Supp. 705 (E.D. Va. 1995).
93. Id. at 710.
94. Id. at 706.
95. Id. Ante and King also executed a personal guaranty of the loan in favor of
the Bank. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Two of the new partners contended that they did not become partners
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through November 1986, the Bank made eight additional ad-
vances totaling approximately $500,000."8
The office building was built and the Partnership made nu-
merous payments, but ultimately defaulted.99 A foreclosure
sale resulted in net proceeds to the Bank of approximately
$900,000 and judgment was entered against the Partnership in
the amount of approximately $1.2 million.' Ante and King
were released from liability by their respective bankruptcy
discharges, and the Bank sought to hold the three additional
partners liable for the eight advances in the amount of approxi-
mately $500,000.1°1 The court held that the liability for the
loans could be satisfied only by the Partnership's assets be-
cause the debt arose prior to the admission of the three
partners into the Partnership.10 The relevant section in the
Virginia Uniform Partnership Act"3 provides in part that "[a]
person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership is
liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before
his admission as though he had been a partner when such ob-
ligations were incurred, except that this liability shall be satis-
fied only out of partnership property."10
4
Although approximately $500,000 of advances were made to
the Partnership after the admission of the three partners, the
court found that under the terms of the loan documents and
under applicable law, the obligation of the Bank to make the
advances and the obligation of the Partnership to repay the
debt arose on April 30, 1985 when the loan documents were
executed." 5 First, the court held that the loan documents
created in the [P]artnership an entitlement to $2 million
payable from time to time on satisfaction of certain condi-
until 1987 and that prior to such time they were lenders of the Partnership. The
court disagreed, based upon evidence in the record including that the 1986 K-1 sched-
ules for the Partnership reflected that the two partners held partnership interests. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 710.
103. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to -43.10 (Repl. Vol. 1994).
104. Id. § 50-17.
105. Citizens Bank, 874 F. Supp. at 707-08.
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tions precedent, and they imposed on the [P]artnership the
obligation to repay, with interest, all funds advanced up to
$2 million.
... Thus, notwithstanding the somewhat contingent ar-
rangement respecting disbursement of the loan, the obliga-
tions to disburse the total sum of $2 million and to repay
all amounts disbursed up to $2 million (with interest) were
fixed on April 30, 1985."'6
Second, the court noted that the intent of the drafters of
section 17 of the Uniform Partnership Act and the interpreta-
tion of such provision by other jurisdictions,'0 7 supported the
long-standing principle that a partnership obligation arises
within the meaning of section 17, when the creditor extends the
credit to the partnership.' "[W]here a partnership under-
takes a debt before a new partner is made '[t]he credit of [the]
new member ... does not enter into the consideration of the
creditors of the old firm, and it would be manifestly unjust to
hold the new partner liable.'"" 9
The court concluded the opinion by noting that creditors can
protect themselves by constructing and administering loans to
partnerships so as to reach the personal assets of partners
admitted during the disbursement of term advances."0 Absent
such provisions, "the personal assets of an incoming partner are
not available to satisfy post-admission advances under the
terms of a pre-admission contract.""'
C. Liability under the Federal Securities Laws for Predictions
of Future Financial Results
In Hillson Partners Limited Partnership v. Adage, Inc.,"
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a public compa-
ny's positive predictions in quarterly reports and press releases
106. Id. at 708.
107. The court examined cases in other jurisdictions because the case was one of
first impression under Virginia law. Id. at 706.
108. Id. at 710.
109. Id. (quoting Stephens v. Neely, 255 S.W. 562 (Ark. 1923)).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
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that subsequently proved inaccurate, did not constitute false
statements or omissions of material fact actionable under the
federal securities laws." 3
Adage, Inc. (Adage), a public corporation organized under the
laws of Pennsylvania, was involved in the business of manu-
facturing specialty products as well as the real estate develop-
ment and management business."4 Adage conducted these
businesses through its subsidiaries, Allister Controls, Inc.
("Allister") and Fort Orange Paper Company ("Fort
Orange")." Robert H. Cahill ("Cahill") was the president and
chief executive officer of Adage at all times during which the
alleged violations occurred."' At issue in Hillson Partners
were various public statements made by Cahill and Adage dur-
ing the period from April 1992, through December 1992, con-
cerning Adage, Allister and Fort Orange.
In an April 30, 1992 press report, Cahill was quoted as tell-
ing a group of security analysts that Adage expected "to report
revenue increases" for its first quarter ending March 31, 1992,
due in part to "improved performance in the Allister electronic
access controls division."" On May 5, Adage reported a forty-
five percent increase in its net income for the first quarter of
1992 over its net income for the first quarter of 1991."1
Adage attributed the increase to, among other reasons, de-
creased expenses because of a restructuring and the acquisition
of a new subsidiary, RELM Communications, that increased
Adage's working capital."' The May 5 report also stated that
Allister had reduced costs, improved its gross margins, and that
further progress was expected. 2 The report stated that Fort
Orange continued to have excellent performance and that Adage
expected these results to improve with the savings from a
cogeneration plant expected to begin operation during the sum-
113. Id. at 220.
114. Id. at 206.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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mer of 1992 and from additional capital improvements. 21 In a
press release also issued on May 5, Cahill was quoted as saying
that he expected that "1992 will produce excellent results for
Adage," and in a May 19 press release, Cahill was quoted as
stating that Adage was "on target toward achieving the most
profitable year in its history and expects to exceed, by a com-
fortable margin, its previous net income record of $1.7 million
set in 1990."'
On August 11, 1992, Adage released its second quarter report
noting that the company was "in the midst of an excellent
year," though stating that Allister's garage door opener busi-
ness was suffering from economic conditions in the housing
industry.' The August 11 report also showed a substantial
increase in net income over the company's net income for the
first and second quarters of 1991.'
On November 4, 1992, Adage announced in a press release
that during the previous week it had dismissed the president
and six other high ranking executives of Allister. Cahill ex-
plained in the press release that Allister had lost over $1 mil-
lion in the first half of 1992. 5 On November 13, Adage re-
leased its third quarter report and announced a net loss of
$153,000, despite an increase in revenues of thirty-one percent
over the revenues reported for the third quarter of 1991.2
Adage explained in the report that the loss was due in part to
a "decision to postpone short term gains in favor of long term
benefits" at Fort Orange and to disappointing results from
Allister.' The management change at Allister was projected
to result in substantial annual cost savings, and Adage predict-
ed an "excellent fourth quarter" with "significant improvements
during 1993."
121. I&
122. Id
123. I&
124. Id. at 207.
125. Id-
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id
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Two weeks before the end of the fourth quarter, on Decem-
ber 15, 1992, the Wall Street Journal, relying on statements
from Cahill, reported that Adage expected a better fourth quar-
ter and a better year in both sales and overall net income than
the preceding year."9 On March 5, 1993, Adage issued its
fourth quarter and year-end results. For the fourth quarter,
Adage reported net income of $231,000, a decrease of $97,000
from net income reported for the fourth quarter of 1991.130
For the year, Adage reported net income of $1,089,000, a seven-
ty-five percent increase over the $622,000 of net income for
1991, but $700,000 less than net income for 1990."l After Ad-
age disclosed these results, the per share price of Adage stock
dropped to $4.25 from a high of $6.37 earlier in the year. 132
On August 9, 1993, Hillson Partners Limited Partnership
filed a shareholder class action suit against Adage, Cahill and
other officers of Adage, on behalf of those who purchased Adage
common stock between April 30, 1992 and March 9, 1993. The
complaint alleged that the statements described above concern-
ing Adage and its subsidiaries were materially false and mis-
leading in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934, as amended ("Exchange Act"), and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder."' The district court granted
Adage's motion to dismiss, finding that Cahill's statements as
to Adage's expected overall performance in 1992 and as to
Allister's performance were not sufficiently material to support
claims for securities fraud and that Hillson had failed to allege
any damages resulting from Cahill's statements as to Fort Or-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 208.
133. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5). The complaint
also alleged violations of the Maryland Securities Act and claims of torts of fraud and
negligent misrepresentation, which the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
after dismissing the federal claims. The complaint also noted that Cahill and other
officers and directors of Adage were parties to a Contingent Share Agreement that
entitled them to receive, in the aggregate, approximately 2.4 million shares of Adage
common stock if the stock price was maintained at certain levels over a ninety-day
period prior to August 27, 1993. Id. In a footnote, the court noted that although the
Contingent Share Agreement was not relevant to its decision, the per share price of
Adage's common stock never approached the $9 per share contemplated in the Con-
tingent Share Agreement. Id. at 208 n.3.
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ange.'" The court of appeals affirmed the district court's de-
cision based on a holding that the statements at issue neither
misstated nor omitted material facts." 5
To establish liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must prove (1) the defendant made
a false statement or omission of material fact (2) with scienter
(3) upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied (4) that proximate-
ly caused the plaintiff's damages.' The court ruled that the
case at hand turned on the first part of the test, which consists
of two elements: (1) a false statement or omission of fact
(2) that is material.' In order to fulfill the materiality re-
quirement in a 10b-5 claim," [t]here must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available."'"
With respect to contingent or speculative information or
events, the court provided that materiality will depend upon a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will
occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the
totality of the company activity.3 9 Statements of belief or
opinions can constitute statements with respect to material
facts for purposes of the securities laws if they are opinions or
beliefs as to current facts.' However, the court noted, "soft,
puffmg statements" lack materiality because the market is not
influenced by vague statements predicting growth.' Predic-
tions of future growth not worded as guarantees are generally
134. Id. at 208.
135. Id. at 205-06.
136. Id. at 208 (citing Cooke v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256, 1260-61
(4th Cir. 1993)); accord Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471, 476 (4th Cir. 1994);
Myers v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d
485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom. Schatz v. Weinberg & Green, 503 U.S.
936 (1992).
137. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d at 209.
138. Id. (quoting Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)).
139. Id. (quoting Levinson, 485 U.S. at 238).
140. Id. (citing Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092-93
(1991)).
141. Id. at 211 (quoting Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289-90 (4th
Cir. 1993)).
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not actionable under the federal securities laws.' Therefore,
as the court noted:
[m]istatements or omissions regarding actual past or pres-
ent facts are far more likely to be actionable than state-
ments regarding predictions of future performance. General-
ly the latter will be deemed actionable under [section] 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 only if they are supported by specific state-
ments of fact or are worded as guarantees.'
The court then applied the foregoing doctrine to the state-
ments made by Adage and Cahill. With respect to the April and
May press releases and first quarter report issued on May 5,
1992, the court found that the statements that Allister's per-
formance should improve, that "1992 will produce excellent re-
sults for Adage" and that Adage is "on target toward achieving
the most profitable year in its history," were all predictions as
to future events, not statements as to present facts or guaran-
tees.1' Thus, the court determined that all of the April and
May statements constituted the type of vague predictions of
growth that are not material as a matter of law under Raab
and Malone.'
Similarly, the court found that the August statements that
Allister's operations "should significantly improve" were even
more indefinite than the April and May statements and were
"expressly contingent on other market conditions." Further-
more, the court did not find that the failure to disclose
Allister's problems in more detail to be an omission of material
facts because details were available in Adage's 1992 Annual
Report on Form 10-K filed by the company in March, 1992. 4'
Hillson also alleged that the statements in the August report
that "Adage is in the midst of an excellent year" and that "[Ad-
142. Id. (quoting Raab, 4 F.3d at 290).
143. Id. at 212 (quoting Malone v. Microdyne, 26 F.3d 471, 479 (4th Cir. 1994).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. ("securities laws require disclosure of information that is not otherwise in
the public domain, not information that has already been publicly-indeed, official-
ly--disclosed by the company").
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age is] on track to exceed 1990, our record year for net income,"
were expressions of belief or opinion as to current facts under
Sandberg, made without any reasonable basis. The court held
that to the extent that these were expressions of belief as to
current facts, the statements were reasonably based on the
company's performance during the first half of 1992.' To
the extent that the statements were addressed to the second
half of 1992, they were expressions of belief as to uncertain
future performance which, the court held, are not actionable
under Sandberg.'
With respect to the November and December statements, the
court noted that such statements were accurate except to the
extent that they predicted that the company's 1992 fourth
quarter net income would exceed net income reported for the
fourth quarter of 1991.5 The court held that Hillson, howev-
er, did not allege facts to indicate that these statements were
not believed when made.'5 ' The court also observed that these
statements contained cautionary language by discussing
Allister's problems and speaking in terms of "improve-
ment."'52 Finally, the court pointed out that the difference be-
tween the company's predicted income for the fourth quarter
(approximately 1.4% of revenues or $330,000) and its delivered
income (only 0.9% of revenues, or $231,000) was only 0.5% of
total revenues, a difference that was "hardly material."'
148. Id. at 214.
149. Id. The court recognized that the timing of a prediction could contribute to its
materiality, but that
an inference from timing alone is not sufficient, without additional sup-
porting facts and circumstances . . . timing has only been considered sig-
nificant in cases in which there were circumstances other than timing
that may have justified investor reliance, such as where a company has
made specific dollar predictions or a number of very positive predictions,
and in which there were allegations of specific evidence, other than tim-
ing, demonstrating that those predictions had no factual basis.
Id. at 215-16.
150. Id. at 217.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 218.
153. Id at 219.
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III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
During the 1995 session of the Virginia General Assembly,
fourteen bills affecting corporate, partnership, limited liability
company and securities law were passed by the General Assem-
bly and signed into law by Governor Allen."
A. Limited Liability Companies
The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act and certain
related sections of the Virginia Code pertaining to limited liabil-
ity companies ("LLC(s)") have been amended to, among other
things, clarify the agency authority of members and managers
of LLCs and to specify the obligations of members to the credi-
tors of a LLC for unpaid contributions.
1. Management of LLCs
The General Assembly has created a distinction between two
separate types of LLCs, manager-managed LLCs, and member-
managed LLCs.'55 LLCs are classified into one category or the
other according to the provisions for management set forth in
154. The legislation enacted in the corporate, partnership, limited liability company
and securities law areas that is not discussed in this article includes changes to pro-
visions regarding the registered name of foreign corporations which now require that
a foreign corporation who has registered its name in Virginia must re-register during
the 60-day period preceding expiration of the one-year period from its initial regis-
tration. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-632 and 13.1-831 (Cum. Supp. 1995). This change
allows registration applicants to be charged a flat fee of twenty dollars on an annual
basis from the date of registration. A foreign corporation that is authorized to do
business in the Commonwealth may have such authorization revoked by the State
Corporation Commission when the Commission finds that the foreign corporation "no
longer exists, by virtue of dissolution, termination, merger or consolidation under the
laws of the state or country of its incorporation." Id. §§ 13.1-769, -931. Other enacted
legislation states that a professional corporation may agree to eliminate its board of
directors. Id. § 13.1-553. Also, the filing fee of $10.00 applicable to a statement of
change of address of registered office or registered agent for stock corporations, non-
stock corporations, limited liability companies and limited partnerships has been elim-
inated. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-616, 13.1-816, 13.1-1005, and 50-73.17 (Cum. Supp.
1995).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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the articles of organization or the operating agreement of the
LLC.5
6
In a member-managed LLC, each member is an agent of the
LLC "for the purpose of its business."'57 For acts taken in the
ordinary course of business of the LLC, a member has the pow-
er to contractually bind the LLC to third parties unless the
member does not have actual authority and the third party to
the transaction is aware of this fact.'58 For actions taken out-
side of the ordinary course of business, a member has a re-
duced level of apparent authority and therefore can only con-
tractually bind the LLC to third parties if such member is
actually authorized by the LLC to act on its behalf.'59 The
rule with respect to actions not in the ordinary course focuses
solely on the presence or absence of authority in the contracting
member and applies regardless of the mental state of the mem-
ber or the other contracting party.6 '
In a manager-managed LLC, a member of the LLC has no
authority to act on behalf of, or contractually bind, the LLC
merely by reason of his status as a member.'6 ' In this respect,
a member of a manager-managed LLC is similar to a share-
holder of a corporation in that the mere fact of ownership does
not convey any authority to act on behalf of the company. By
contrast, each manager is only an agent of the LLC for the
purpose of conducting its business. 6 ' For actions taken by a
manager, amendments to the limited liability act indicate that
managers are constrained by the same rules as those that ap-
ply to a member of a member-managed LLC as described above.
The General Assembly has further provided that unless limit-
ed by the articles of organization of an LLC, both a member of
a member-managed LLC and a manager of a manager-managed
156. Id
157. Id. § 13.1-1021.1(A)(1).
158. Id. § 13.1-1021.1(A)(2).
159. Id. § 13.1-1021.1(A)(3).
160. For a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the apparent authority
doctrine with respect to LLCs, see 1 LARRY E. RmSTEIN AND ROBERT R. KEATINGS,
LIMrTED LIABILIY COMPANIES, § 8.05 (1994).
161. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1021.1(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
162. Id- § 13.1-1021.1(B)(2).
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LLC have the ability (and thus, the apparent authority) to
transfer real property, and thereby contractually bind the LLC
to such transfer, to a bona fide purchaser for value who has no
knowledge of the lack of actual authority of the member or
manager." A member or manager has the power to transfer
real property under the above-described circumstances regard-
less of whether or not such transfer would be considered in the
ordinary course of business.
2. Contribution to LLCs
With respect to contributions made by members to a LLC,
the General Assembly has made it more difficult for a creditor
of the LLC who has unsatisfied debts owed to it by the LLC to
enforce the obligation of a member to make a contribution
when that obligation has been compromised by the other mem-
bers of the LLC (i.e., the other members of the LLC have sus-
pended or released a member's obligation to contribute to the
LLC). Prior law permitted a creditor of an LLC to force a mem-
ber to make a contribution which was compromised by the oth-
er members of the LLC.1' As the law has been amended, a
creditor seeking to enforce a compromised obligation to make a
contribution to the LLC must prove that, in extending credit,
he reasonably relied on the obligation of the member to make
such compromised contribution. 6'
The General Assembly has also clarified the law regarding
contributions to LLCs by giving LLCs much greater enumerated
powers of enforcement with regard to delinquent contributions
from members. In fact, permissible penalties for failure to make
a required contribution now include, among other measures, re-
ducing the defaulting member's proportionate interest in the
LLC, subordinating his interest, forcing a sale of his interest,
and the complete forfeiture of his interest.'66 The potential for
abuse of such draconian powers is limited by the fact that such
163. Id. § 13.1-1021.1(C).
164. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1027 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-1027 (Cum. Supp. 1995)).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1027(C) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
166. Id. § 13.1-1027(D).
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penalties must be agreed to by the members of the LLC and
specified in the articles of organization or the operating agree-
ment of the LLC."67
3. Registration Fees
Lastly, in the area of LLCs, the General Assembly has acted
to resolve a problem that had previously existed with regard to
LLCs and limited partnerships. Under prior law, it was possible
for a LLC or a limited partnership to be required to pay both
an initial registration fee (if it was formed prior to July 1 of
such calendar year) and an annual registration fee (which was
assessed against all LLCs and limited partnerships in existence
as of July 1 of such calendar year). Sections 13.1-1062 and 50-
73.67 of the Virginia Code have been amended to provide that
LLCs and limited partnerships, respectively, are only obligated
to pay the annual registration fee of $50 for each year after the
calendar year in which they pay their initial registration fee,
thus averting the double payment problem that had arisen
under previous law."
B. Crimes by Corporate Entities
The General Assembly has clarified that corporate entities
may be fined as a result of certain types of felony convic-
tions. 69 Prior to this clarification, corporate entities could not
have been punished for these felonies because the law did not
permit the imposition of a fine without also requiring im-
prisonment, a punishment that cannot be imposed on an entity
which is not a natural person.'
167. Id.
168. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1062, 50-73.67 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
169. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(g) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
170. David G. Shuford, VBA Fares Well in 1995 General Assembly, VA. B. ASS'N
J., Spring 1995, at 14.
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C. Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
1. Limited Partnerships as Registered Limited Liability
Partnerships.
The 1995 session of the General Assembly produced changes
in the area of partnership law, specifically with respect to regis-
tered limited liability partnerships. Article 7 of the Uniform
Partnership Act, which addresses formation and maintenance of
registered limited liability partnerships, has been amended to
reflect that a limited partnership may become a registered
limited liability partnership simply by complying with the new-
ly amended provisions of the Virginia Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (VRULPA)."'7 As indicated in the next para-
graph, in this way limited partnerships can protect their gener-
al partners from the full range of liability which typically ad-
heres to such general partners.
The General Assembly revised the VRULPA to indicate that
a limited partnership can qualify and function as a registered
limited liability partnership as well as a limited partnership if
three events concur. 72 First, the limited partnership must
register as a limited liability partnership pursuant to Section
50-43.1 of the Virginia Code (Article 7 of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act).' 7" Second, the limited partnership must meet the
insurance or financial responsibility requirements for registered
limited liability partnerships specified in section 50-43.3 of the
Virginia Code.'74 Third, the limited partnership's name must
include both the phrase "limited partnership" or an abbreviation
thereof and the phrase "registered limited liability partnership"
or the abbreviation LLP.'75 In applying the registered limited
liability partnership statute to a limited partnership, all refer-
ences therein to partners are to be interpreted as referring to
general partners.'76
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-43.12 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
172. Id. § 50-73.78(A).
173. Id. § 50-73.78(A)(1).
174. Id. § 50-73.78(A)(2).
175. Id. § 50-73.78(A)(3).
176. Id. § 50-73.78(B).
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2. Dissolution of Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
With respect to the dissolution of a registered limited liability
partnership, the General Assembly has indicated that if a do-
mestic or foreign registered limited liability partnership is dis-
solved, but its business continues without liquidation, the regis-
tration of such partnership then continues in force, and no
further filing is required of such partnership until such time as
the registration is to be renewed or withdrawn. 77  This
amendment will afford registered limited liability partnerships
which have experienced a technical event of dissolution the
opportunity not to file immediately a new registration for the
partnership.
3. Law Firms as Registered Limited Liability Partnerships
The General Assembly has enacted a special rule with regard
to registered limited liability partnerships engaging in the prac-
tice of law. In addition to the requirements of the Uniform
Partnership Act and the VRULPA, a registered limited liability
partnership engaging in the practice of law also must obtain a
registration certificate from the Virginia State Bar pursuant to
the registration provisions that were previously only applicable
to professional corporations and professional limited liability
companies engaged in the practice of law.' 8
D. Virginia Securities Act
During the 1995 Session, the Virginia General Assembly
authorized the State Corporation Commission (the Commission)
to create by rule three new exemptions to the registration re-
quirements of the Virginia securities laws normally applicable
to the offer or sale of securities by issuers, broker dealers and
agents.
177. Id. §§ 50-43.1(H), -43.7(I).
178. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3902 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
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1. Limited Offering Exemption
The limited offering exception found at section 13.1-514(B)(7)
of the Virginia Code has been significantly expanded. Prior to
amendment, a sale of its securities by an issuer or a registered
broker dealer acting on behalf of the issuer was a transaction
exempt from registration if, after the sale, the issuer had fewer
than thirty-five securities holders, and the issuer or its broker
dealer or agent engaged in no advertisement to, or solicitation
of, the general public.19 With the amendments to section
13.1-514(B)(7), the Commission has been given authority to
create by rule an exemption from the registration requirements
for any offer or sale of securities by the issuer (but not a regis-
tered broker dealer or agent) to no more than thirty-five per-
sons in the Commonwealth during any twelve month period. 8 '
By the terms of the enabling statute, the Commission's rule
must be limited in two ways. First, the issuer must reasonably
believe that all purchasers in the Commonwealth are pur-
chasing the security for investment.' 8 ' From a practitioner's
standpoint, this translates into a requirement that the issuer
receive a letter from each investor, prior to the sale of securi-
ties to such investor, which states that the investor is acquiring
such securities for investment and not with a view to resale.
Second, as with the previous limited offering exception now
codified as section 13.1-514(B)(7), securities exempted by sec-
tion 13.1-514(B)(7) cannot be offered generally to the public by
advertisement or general solicitation. 8'
The State Corporation Commission has acted on the authori-
ty granted to it by the General Assembly and enacted a rule to
define the parameters of this new limited offering exemp-
tion." The rule contains many provisions regarding the non-
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7) (Repl. Vol. 1993) (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1995)).
180. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Cure. Supp. 1995).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) $ 60,440F, at 53,527-29. (Rules of State Corpora-
tion Commission, Article V, § 11).
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availability of the exemption which the issuer must carefully
scrutinize prior to reliance on this exemption. Among other
things, the rule indicates that an issuer may raise no more
than $100,000 in any twelve-month period, nor more than
$500,000 total pursuant to this rule.' The Commission has
required that the issuer deliver to the Commission certain docu-
mentation (including a form VA-1 and form U2) fifteen days
prior to the first sale of securities pursuant to the rule." The
Commission has also required a $250 non-refundable filing fee
to be paid to the Commission along with the aforementioned
documentation.'86 Finally, the rule requires that the issuer
may only sell to sophisticated buyers who, after reasonable in-
quiry by the issuer, appear capable of evaluating and bearing
the economic risks inherent in securities purchases."'
2. Securities of Professional Business Entities
The General Assembly has exempted from the registration
requirements of the securities laws transactions which involve
"any offer or sale of securities issued by a professional business
entity.., to a person licensed or otherwise legally authorized
to render within this Commonwealth the same professional ser-
vices.""s "Professional business entity" is defined in subsection
A of section 13.1-1102 to mean a professional limited liability
company, a professional corporation, or a partnership in which
each partner is licensed to provide the professional service for
which the partnership was formed.'89 The General Assembly
further indicated that the existence of this exemption should
have no effect on the definition of "security" with regard to pro-
fessional business entities.'90 From a practical standpoint, this
exemption will allow law firms, accounting firms and similar
business entities which have grown much larger in recent years
184. Id. at 53,528.
185. Id.
186. I&
187. Id- at 53,529.
188. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(17) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
189. Id. § 13.1-1102(A).
190. Id. § 13.1-514(B)(17).
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to continue offering interests to their members without register-
ing such interests pursuant to the Virginia securities laws.
3. Alignment with Federal Exemptions
Lastly in the securities area, the General Assembly, in order
to align Virginia's rules with federal securities exemptions
made minor revisions to the State Corporation Commission's
authority to exempt by rule certain transactions prior to
amendment, section 13.1-514(B)(13) of the Virginia Code indi-
cated that any rule promulgated by the Commission to effect
alignment with the federal exemptions should not exempt bro-
ker dealers or agents from registration requirements. 9' With
the revision the Commission may, by rule, exempt "an agent of
the issuer who receives no sales commission directly or indirect-
ly for offering or selling the securities."92
E. Filing Requirements and Payment Obligations
Pertinent sections of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act, the
Virginia Non-Stock Corporation Act, the Virginia Limited Lia-
bility Company Act, and the VRULPA have been amended to
take into account the extensive use of photocopy and facsimile
machines in the modern office. Documents filed with the Com-
mission no longer need to contain original signatures; a photo-
copied signature will suffice if the document is legible and able
to be reformatted and reproduced in archival quality.' 9' Addi-
tionally, the Commission will now accept a facsimile of a signa-
ture, making possible filings by officers of the corporation who
are away on business or vacation. Perhaps most revolutionary
is the fact that the Commission is now authorized to accept
electronic filings of any information which is required to be
filed with the Commission.' The Commission will promulgate
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(13) (Repl. Vol. 1993) (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(17) (Cum. Supp. 1995)).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(13) (Cum. Supp. 1995). For the rule as enacted
by the State Corporation Commission, see 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 60,439, at
53,520 (Rules of State Corporation Commission, Article V, § 4).
193. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-604(D), 13.1-804(D), 13.1-1003(D), and 50-73.17(A)
(Curn. Supp. 1995).
194. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-604(K), 13.1-804(K), 13.1-1003(J), and 50-73.17(A)
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rules for the "methods of execution, recording, reproduction and
certification of electronically filed information."95
Documents to be executed in the name of the corporation
have previously been required to be executed by only a certain
select group of officers of a corporation. With the passage of
new legislation, however, the General Assembly has required
the Commission to accept, as the binding signature on behalf of
a corporation, the signature of any officer authorized by the
corporation to act on its behalf.'96 This removes the require-
ment of finding the correct titular officer when a filing must be
signed.
In another attempt to recognize the variety of modern meth-
ods of doing business, the General Assembly has authorized the
Commission to accept payment of any amount due to it by
means of: (1) check, (2) credit card, (3) electronic funds transfer,
or (4) any other means approved by the Commission.'97 The
Commission is also allowed to charge a service fee to cover its
costs associated with the new payment methods. 9 ' Already a
model of efficiency, the Commission will benefit greatly, as will
the practitioners with whom it works, from electronic filing and
electronic payment methods.
(Cum. Supp. 1995).
195. Id.
196. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-604(F), 13.1-804(F) (Cum. Supp. 1995).
197. VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-17 (Cur. Supp. 1995).
198. Id § 12.17(A).
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